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SUBJECT: SOMALIA/1267: UN OFFICIAL OFFERS INSIGHT INTO AMISOM'S FUTURE AND PRESSES AGAIN ON JUMALE DELISTING

REF: A. NAIROBI 2553

[1](#)B. STATE 08498

[1](#)C. NAIROBI 901

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[1](#)1. (C) SUMMARY: Nick Pyle, Special Adviser to Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, discussed a sanctions delisting request and political developments in Somalia with USUN on March 17. He described President Sharif as tolerating, but not embracing AMISOM, and said Sharif's government opposed further deployments beyond the third Ugandan and Burundian battalions. Pyle urged USUN to reconsider the sanctions delisting request of Ahmed Nur Ali Jumale (Ref A, B, C), opining that sanctions were a useful two-fold tool in Somalia to deter bad behavior by targeting "spoilers" to the peace process. Pyle also urged new sanctions designations for those who undermine the peace process, as was envisioned in UNSCR 1844. END SUMMARY.

President Sharif's Position on AMISOM  
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[1](#)2. (C) Nick Pyle, a career UK diplomat seconded to the UN Political office for Somalia (UNPOS) as Special Adviser to the Secretary General (SRSG) for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, met with USUN on March 17. His main objective was to press for the delisting of Ahmed Nur Ali Jumale, but he also offered his insight into President Sharif's view of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and payment of stipends to Somali security forces.

[1](#)3. (C) Pyle said that his conversations with senior officials in Sharif's government (including Deputy Prime Minister Abdirahman Ibrahim, Minister of International Cooperation Abdirahman Warsame and National Security Minister Omar Hashi) revealed lingering suspicion of AMISOM. Sharif's government supported the deployment of the third Burundian and Ugandan battalions to AMISOM, as "they will be needed to train Somali forces," but did not support further deployments to AMISOM, including a potential Nigerian deployment, Pyle said. The officials said that Sharif planned to ask AMISOM to leave Somalia once it was no longer needed to train Somali forces.

[1](#)4. (C) Pyle said that UNPOS approached President Sharif before his election to inform him that given the nature of his new position, a statement from him in support of AMISOM would be crucial to the international community. Sharif reportedly said that while he had not asked for AMISOM deployment to Somalia, he had "no problem with them" and understood that they were protecting key installations. Pyle

worried that AMISOM's limited ability to train Somali forces could lead the TFG to conclude incorrectly that AMISOM had outlived its usefulness.

#### Somali Forces: Stipends More Important Than Training

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15. (C) Pyle commented that financial contributions to pay stipends were actually more important to the success of the peace process than training or security sector reform. He said the greatest misjudgment would be to train soldiers for a force that could not be paid, citing the example of UNDP-trained Somali police who joined militias because they had not received stipends from the Yusuf administration or the international community. Pyle said that SRSG Ould-Abdallah understood the concern - particularly of Western donors - over paying stipends to effectively fund a pro-government militia. For this reason, he believed that enlisting Western support to urge contributions from non-traditional donors, including Gulf states, might be a more successful strategy.

#### Sanctions: A Possible Tool to Deter Bad Behavior

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16. (C) Pyle urged USUN to reconsider the sanctions delisting request of Ahmed Nur Ali Jumale. (NOTE: The 1267 al-Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions Committee designated Jumale in November 2001. The 1267 Committee rejected Jumale's delisting petition in December 2008. END NOTE.) Pyle noted that this delisting request was a top priority of SRSG Ould-Abdallah. The SRSG believed Jumale deserved to be delisted for his support to the peace process. Pyle noted, however, that the paper trail for Jumale's case was "deeply flawed" and the evidence provided in his 2008 petition did not warrant his delisting. Pyle opined that in order for Jumale to be delisted, he would need to make a more credible, evidence-based case to show how his behavior has positively

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changed. Pyle noted that Jumale's argument that he was "wrongly listed" was not sufficient enough for his delisting. (NOTE: Pyle noted that he had not yet been able to convey this message to the SRSG. END NOTE). Pyle said he was gathering evidence for Jumale's delisting and that they probably would attempt another delisting request in 2009, timed to the comprehensive review in the 1267 Committee of all 500 names on the Committee's Consolidated List.

17. (C) USUN explained to Pyle that the most important criteria for his possible delisting would be his ability to demonstrate that he is not linked to Al Qaeda or the Taliban; support to the peace process or other "good deeds" were not alone sufficient to merit delisting. USUN told Pyle that Jumale's delisting request was also complicated because it was submitted as part of the same package as a delisting request for Barakaat International, an entity involved in high-profile litigation in Europe challenging its designation. USUN encouraged the SRSG to share any relevant information with the United States on a bilateral basis before going to the 1267 Committee.

18. (C) Pyle commented that the international community was not making the most of the carrots and sticks at its disposal in Somalia, specifically sanctions. Ideally, he said, linking reconciliation for positive behavior to delisting requests could be used as an incentive, while targeted sanctions against "spoilers" (such as warlords and militias) could be used to stop bad behavior. In this context, Pyle strongly urged new designations for political spoilers, as was envisioned in UNSCR 1844. (NOTE: Adopted in November 2008, UNSCR 1844 established a targeted sanctions regime for those who undermine the political process, obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance or violate the arms embargo. The Somalia Sanctions Committee has designated no persons or entities under this regime as of March 2009. END NOTE)

19. (C) Pyle described SRSG Ould-Abdallah as tenacious and Machiavellian, noting the SRSG consciously made it his policy not to put a strategy for Somalia down on paper. Pyle noted that Ould-Abdallah believed a paper trail would inevitably be leaked to the Somalia press and would spoil his plans for Somalia. Pyle did note, however, that the recent documents from the International Contact Group's meetings in Brussels at the end of February were Pyle's attempt to informally lay out a coherent strategy for Somalia.

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